FIELD NOTE / X
A delegate is not the approver.
The complete written thought and the evidence behind it. The video edition will follow its public release.
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A delegate is not the approver.
Video caption
A delegate is not the approver. That hides the actor and the approved scope. A handoff should not widen the service permission. #EricFieldNotes
Full written post / accessibility read
Handoffs make work move cleanly between agents. They do not automatically grant the second agent permission to act for a customer or a human owner. A task message is evidence of requested work, not a service authorization token.
Imagine a research agent asks a publishing agent to send a draft. The publishing agent holds one broad API key and can post to every account. The recipient service cannot tell which owner, channel, draft or expiry the research agent intended. The problem is in the credential boundary.
Where your identity service supports it, exchange for a short-lived delegated token with a named audience and scope. Otherwise issue an application permit with equivalent checks. The target service verifies it before posting and returns an action receipt.
Attempt an out-of-scope channel, expired permit and different draft through the delegate. Require service denial and no public post. Do this because the agent's words cannot substitute for the target's authorization decision.
#EricFieldNotes
Four-beat scene transcript
1. A delegate is not the approver.
Handoffs make work move cleanly between agents. They do not automatically grant the second agent permission to act for a customer or a human owner. A task message is evidence of requested work, not a service authorization token.
Visual: Agent-to-agent messages can blur who authorized the effect.
2. The service only sees a broad credential.
Imagine a research agent asks a publishing agent to send a draft. The publishing agent holds one broad API key and can post to every account. The recipient service cannot tell which owner, channel, draft or expiry the research agent intended. The problem is in the credential boundary.
Visual: That hides the actor and the approved scope.
3. Carry a narrow permit to the effect.
Where your identity service supports it, exchange for a short-lived delegated token with a named audience and scope. Otherwise issue an application permit with equivalent checks. The target service verifies it before posting and returns an action receipt.
Visual: Bind actor, subject, object, operation and expiry.
4. Test the delegate's effective power.
Attempt an out-of-scope channel, expired permit and different draft through the delegate. Require service denial and no public post. Do this because the agent's words cannot substitute for the target's authorization decision.
Visual: A handoff should not widen the service permission.
Research and claim limits
The examples identified as illustrative or simulated are design probes, not reported incidents. Vendor specifications do not establish workload performance.